Authentication Primitives for Protocol Specifications

  • Chiara Bodei
  • Pierpaolo Degano
  • Riccardo Focardi
  • Corrado Priami
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2763)


We advocate here the use of two authentication primitives we recently propose in a calculus for distributed systems, as a further instrument for programmers interested in authentication. These primitives offer a way of abstracting from various specifications of authentication and obtaining idealized protocols “secure by construction”. We can consequently prove that a cryptographic protocol is the correct implementation of the corresponding abstract protocol; when the proof fails, reasoning on the abstract specification may drive to the correct implementation.


Security Protocol Message Exchange Parallel Composition Cryptographic Protocol Correct Implementation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chiara Bodei
    • 1
  • Pierpaolo Degano
    • 1
  • Riccardo Focardi
    • 2
  • Corrado Priami
    • 3
  1. 1.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità di PisaPisaItaly
  2. 2.Dipartimento di InformaticaUniversità Ca’ Foscari di VeneziaVeneziaItaly
  3. 3.Dipartimento di Informatica e TelecomunicazioniUniversità di TrentoPovo (TN)Italy

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