How Much Security Is Enough to Stop a Thief?

The Economics of Outsider Theft via Computer Systems and Networks
  • Stuart E. Schechter
  • Michael D. Smith
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2742)


We address the question of how much security is required to protect a packaged system, installed in a large number of organizations, from thieves who would exploit a single vulnerability to attack multiple installations. While our work is motivated by the need to help organizations make decisions about how to defend themselves, we also show how they can better protect themselves by helping to protect each other.


Security Economics Threat Models Theft Exploits 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stuart E. Schechter
    • 1
  • Michael D. Smith
    • 1
  1. 1.Harvard UniversityUSA

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