Breaking and Mending Resilient Mix-Nets

  • Lan Nguyen
  • Rei Safavi-Naini
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2760)


In this paper we show two attacks against universally resilient mix-nets. The first attack can be used against a number of mix-nets, including Furukawa-Sako01 [6], Millimix [11], Abe98 [1], MiP-1, MiP-2 [2,3] and Neff01 [19]. We give the details of the attack in the case of Furukawa-Sako01 mix-net. The second attack breaks the correctness of Millimix [11]. We show how to counter these attacks, and give efficiency and security analysis for the proposed countermeasures.


Hash Function Discrete Logarithm Problem Modular Exponentiation Permutation Network Secure Function Evaluation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lan Nguyen
    • 1
  • Rei Safavi-Naini
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Information Technology and Computer ScienceUniversity of WollongongWollongongAustralia

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