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A Generic Protection against High-Order Differential Power Analysis

  • Mehdi-Laurent Akkar
  • Louis Goubin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2887)

Abstract

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on smart-cards was introduced by Paul Kocher [11] in 1998. Since, many countermeasures have been introduced to protect cryptographic algorithms from DPA attacks. Unfortunately these features are known not to be efficient against high order DPA (even of second order). In these paper we will first describe new specialized first order attack and remind how are working high order DPA attacks. Then we will show how these attacks can be applied to two usual actual countermeasures. Eventually we will present a method of protection (and apply it to the DES) which seems to be secure against any order DPA type attacks. The figures of a real implementation of this method will be given too.

Keywords

Smart-cards DES Power analysis High-Order DPA 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mehdi-Laurent Akkar
    • 1
  • Louis Goubin
    • 1
  1. 1.Cryptography ResearchSchlumberger Smart CardsLouveciennes CedexFrance

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