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Price Determination and Profit Sharing for Bidding Groups in Agent-Mediated Auctions

  • Ming-Chih Hsu
  • Von-Wun Soo
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3371)

Abstract

It is a common behavior that a group of rational agents cooperate together as a bidder/seller to bid in an auction. How to determine the group bidding price and how to share the profit among the members in a group has been problems that are not studied thoroughly. In time-critical auctions, the problem is getting more complicated since the group has to decide new bidding prices within time limits. Conventional approaches used a centralized mechanism to assign profit share to each bidding agent in the group that usually lead to negative profit of individual bidding agent. We propose a distributed approach called Z-process that allows individual bidding agents to declare their compromised profit share based on their rationalities, and determines the group bidding prices simultaneously. We show that in Z-process there exists a dominant strategy for rational agents that can let them obtain maximum profit. We can also show that the compromised profit of each individual bidding agent by Z-process satisfies each agent’s rationality.

Keywords

Multiagent System Reservation Price Bidding Price Price Determination Profit Share 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ming-Chih Hsu
    • 1
  • Von-Wun Soo
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceNational Tsing Hua UniversityHsin ChuTaiwan

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