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A Theorem Proving Approach to Analysis of Secure Information Flow

  • Ádám Darvas
  • Reiner Hähnle
  • David Sands
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3450)

Abstract

Most attempts at analysing secure information flow in programs are based on domain-specific logics. Though computationally feasible, these approaches suffer from the need for abstraction and the high cost of building dedicated tools for real programming languages. We recast the information flow problem in a general program logic rather than a problem-specific one. We investigate the feasibility of this approach by showing how a general purpose tool for software verification can be used to perform information flow analyses. We are able to prove security and insecurity of programs including advanced features such as method calls, loops, and object types for the target language Java Card. In addition, we can express declassification of information.

Keywords

Smart Card Secure Information User Interaction Target Language Open Goal 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ádám Darvas
    • 1
  • Reiner Hähnle
    • 2
  • David Sands
    • 2
  1. 1.Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)Zurich
  2. 2.Chalmers University of TechnologySweden

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