Key-Exchange Protocol Using Pre-agreed Session-ID

  • Kenji Imamoto
  • Kouichi Sakurai
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3325)


Technical applications for various uses have been proposed in communication technology in recent years. Although especially the Internet and radio communications are used daily it is known that eavesdropping is easy and the related problem has occurred mostly, especially privacy. In this paper, we introduce Pre-Agreed Session ID (PAS) and formalize a key-exchange protocol using it. PAS is a identification which is a disposable unique value used for every session to protect identity from the attacker. The security notion of identity concealment is formulized in this paper. Moreover, we propose a secure key-exchange protocol using PAS under the cryptographic primitives. Furthermore, we argue about the problems which arise when PAS is introduced.


Diffie-Hellman based key exchange protocol Identity concealment Pre-shared key model Pre-Agreed Session ID 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kenji Imamoto
    • 1
  • Kouichi Sakurai
    • 1
  1. 1.Kyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan

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