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Encrypted Watermarks and Linux Laptop Security

  • Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3325)

Abstract

The most common way to implement full-disk encryption (as opposed to encrypted file systems) in the GNU/Linux operating system is using the encrypted loop device, known as CryptoLoop. We demonstrate clear weaknesses in the current CBC-based implementation of CryptoLoop, perhaps the most surprising being a very simple attack which allows specially watermarked files to be identified on an encrypted hard disk without knowledge of the secret encryption key.

We take a look into the practical problems of securely booting, authenticating, and keying full-disk encryption. We propose simple improvements to the current CryptoLoop implementation based on the notions of tweakable encryption algorithms and enciphering modes. We also discuss sector-level authentication codes.

The new methods have been implemented as a set of patches to the Linux Kernel series 2.6 and the relevant system tools.

Keywords

Hard Disk Block Cipher Advance Encryption Standard Fast Software Encryption Pseudorandom Permutation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratory for Theoretical Computer ScienceHelsinki University of TechnologyFinland

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