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A Universally Composable Secure Channel Based on the KEM-DEM Framework

  • Waka Nagao
  • Yoshifumi Manabe
  • Tatsuaki Okamoto
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3378)

Abstract

For ISO standards on public-key encryption, Shoup introduced the framework of KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism), and DEM (Data Encapsulation Mechanism), for formalizing and realizing one-directional hybrid encryption; KEM is a formalization of asymmetric encryption specified for key distribution, and DEM is a formalization of symmetric encryption. This paper investigates a more general hybrid protocol, secure channel, using KEM and DEM, such that KEM is used for distribution of a session key and DEM, along with the session key, is used for multiple bi-directional encrypted transactions in a session. This paper shows that KEM semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and DEM semantically secure against adaptively chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks (IND-P2-C2) along with secure signatures and ideal certification authority are sufficient to realize a universally composable (UC) secure channel. To obtain the main result, this paper also shows several equivalence results: UC KEM, IND-CCA2 KEM and NM-CCA2 (non-malleable against CCA2) KEM are equivalent, and UC DEM, IND-P2-C2 DEM and NM-P2-C2 DEM are equivalent.

Keywords

Secure Channel Security Notion Decryption Oracle Hybrid Encryption Encryption Oracle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Waka Nagao
    • 1
  • Yoshifumi Manabe
    • 1
    • 2
  • Tatsuaki Okamoto
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Graduate School of InformaticsKyoto UniversityKyotoJapan
  2. 2.NTT LabsNippon Telegraph and Telephone CorporationYokosukaJapan

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