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The Security and Performance of the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of Operation

  • David A. McGrew
  • John Viega
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3348)

Abstract

The recently introduced Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for block ciphers provides both encryption and message authentication, using universal hashing based on multiplication in a binary finite field. We analyze its security and performance, and show that it is the most efficient mode of operation for high speed packet networks, by using a realistic model of a network crypto module and empirical data from studies of Internet traffic in conjunction with software experiments and hardware designs. GCM has several useful features: it can accept IVs of arbitrary length, can act as a stand-alone message authentication code (MAC), and can be used as an incremental MAC. We show that GCM is secure in the standard model of concrete security, even when these features are used. We also consider several of its important system-security aspects.

Keywords

Medium Access Control Clock Cycle Block Cipher Advance Encryption Standard Message Authentication Code 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • David A. McGrew
    • 1
  • John Viega
    • 2
  1. 1.Cisco Systems, Inc. 
  2. 2.Secure Software 

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