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Automatic Extraction of Accurate Application-Specific Sandboxing Policy

  • Lap Chung Lam
  • Tzi-cker Chiueh
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3224)

Abstract

One of the most dangerous cybersecurity threats is control hijacking attacks, which hijack the control of a victim application, and execute arbitrary system calls assuming the identity of the victim program’s effective user. System call monitoring has been touted as an effective defense against control hijacking attacks because it could prevent remote attackers from inflicting damage upon a victim system even if they can successfully compromise certain applications running on the system. However, the Achilles’ heel of the system call monitoring approach is the construction of accurate system call behavior model that minimizes false positives and negatives. This paper describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of a Program semantics-Aware Intrusion Detection system called Paid, which automatically derives an application-specific system call behavior model from the application’s source code, and checks the application’s run-time system call pattern against this model to thwart any control hijacking attacks. The per-application behavior model is in the form of the sites and ordering of system calls made in the application, as well as its partial control flow. Experiments on a fully working Paid prototype show that Paid can indeed stop attacks that exploit non-standard security holes, such as format string attacks that modify function pointers, and that the run-time latency and throughput penalty of Paid are under 11.66% and 10.44%, respectively, for a set of production-mode network server applications including Apache, Sendmail, Ftp daemon, etc.

Keywords

intrusion detection system call graph sandboxing mimicry attack non-deterministic finite state automaton 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lap Chung Lam
    • 1
  • Tzi-cker Chiueh
    • 1
  1. 1.Rether Networks, Inc.CentereachUSA

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