The Price of Anarchy when Costs Are Non-separable and Asymmetric

  • G. Perakis
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-25960-2_4

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3064)
Cite this paper as:
Perakis G. (2004) The Price of Anarchy when Costs Are Non-separable and Asymmetric. In: Bienstock D., Nemhauser G. (eds) Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization. IPCO 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3064. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


In this paper we characterize the “price of anarchy”, i.e., the inefficiency between user and system optimal solutions, when costs are non-separable, asymmetric and nonlinear, generalizing earlier work that has addressed “the price of anarchy” under separable costs. This generalization models traffic equilibria, competitive multi-period pricing and competitive supply chains. The bounds established in this paper are tight and explicitly account for the degree of asymmetry and nonlinearity of the cost function. We introduce an alternate proof method for providing bounds that uses ideas from semidefinite optimization. Finally, in the context of multi-period pricing our analysis establishes that user and system optimal solutions coincide.


System and User-Optimization Traffic Equilibrium Price of Anarchy 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • G. Perakis
    • 1
  1. 1.Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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