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Just Fast Keying in the Pi Calculus

  • Martín Abadi
  • Bruno Blanchet
  • Cédric Fournet
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2986)

Abstract

JFK is a recent, attractive protocol for fast key establishment as part of securing IP communication. In this paper, we analyze it formally in the applied pi calculus (partly in terms of observational equivalences, partly with the assistance of an automatic protocol verifier). We treat JFK’s core security properties, and also other properties that are rarely articulated and studied rigorously, such as resistance to denial-of-service attacks. In the course of this analysis we found some ambiguities and minor problems, but we mostly obtain positive results about JFK. For this purpose, we develop ideas and techniques that should be useful more generally in the specification and verification of security protocols.

Keywords

Shared Secret Security Protocol Perfect Forward Secrecy Identity Protection Active Attacker 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martín Abadi
    • 1
  • Bruno Blanchet
    • 2
  • Cédric Fournet
    • 3
  1. 1.University of CaliforniaSanta Cruz
  2. 2.CNRS, Département d’Informatique, École Normale Supérieure, Paris and Max-Planck-Institut für InformatikSaarbrücken
  3. 3.Microsoft Research 

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