Abstract
This Chapter proposes a new definition of the collective belief of a group, namely what the majority of the members of the group think the collective belief is. Consequently, for an individual i, to determine what the group believes leads him to reflect on how the other members of the group approach this very same question. This definition is very different from the usual definition, whereby “the group G believes P” means simply that the majority of the members of G believe P. Three points are demonstrated. Firstly, the notion of salience or focal point developed by Shelling fits this new definition. Secondly, thus defined, group belief is closely dependent on the cultural and historical context that shapes the identity of the group. Thirdly, and this is our main result, group belief defined in this way is disconnected from what agents really believe. Each individual can believe P and, at the same time, believe that the group believes Q. This is what we call “the autonomy of group belief”.
Keywords
Stock Market Coordination Game Shared Belief Individual Belief Strict Nash EquilibriumPreview
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