Effects of Conflict between Emergent Charging Agents in Social Dilemma

Abstract

This paper shows the agent based simulation with changing roles in the social dilemma game, that is, the Tragedy of the Common. The Tragedy of the Common is known to treat the problem that is how to manage the limited common resource. To control the usage of a common resource, the levy based control strategy is employed. The role of the charging-agents are introduced to charge the levy to other agents in the proposed simulation. The levy based control strategy can be expected to avoid the dilemma situations even if the agents obey the individual rationality. However, to introduce the charging-agents, it should be considered that who became the charging-agents and how to make the charging plan as the levy against the activities of the agents. To solve the problems, it is proposed that the agents have both activities as the normal players and the charging role. The agents in the game can play the both roles. Namely, the proposed agents can change the role between the normal player and the charging-agent autonomously according to the situations. Concerning to adjusting the charging plan, the plan is created by the GA based on the proposed evaluation methods. The evaluation methods include the effects of the conflict between the charging-agents to prevent the selfish behavior. Throughout the experiments, the effects of the changing roles and the formation of the charging plan are examined.