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A Generic Construction for Intrusion-Resilient Public-Key Encryption

  • Yevgeniy Dodis
  • Matt Franklin
  • Jonathan Katz
  • Atsuko Miyaji
  • Moti Yung
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2964)

Abstract

In an intrusion-resilient cryptosystem [10], two entities (a user and a base) jointly evolve a secret decryption key; this provides very strong protection against an active attacker who can break into the user and base repeatedly and even simultaneously. Recently, a construction of an intrusion-resilient public-key encryption scheme based on specific algebraic assumptions has been shown [6]. We generalize this previous work and present a more generic construction for intrusion-resilient public-key encryption from any forward-secure public-key encryption scheme satisfying a certain homomorphic property.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Challenge Ciphertext Decryption Oracle Choose Ciphertext Attack Homomorphic Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yevgeniy Dodis
    • 1
  • Matt Franklin
    • 2
  • Jonathan Katz
    • 3
  • Atsuko Miyaji
    • 4
  • Moti Yung
    • 5
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceNew York University 
  2. 2.University of CaliforniaDavis
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Maryland 
  4. 4.Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology 
  5. 5.Department of Computer ScienceColumbia University 

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