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Tradeoffs in Worst-Case Equilibria

  • Baruch Awerbuch
  • Yossi Azar
  • Yossi Richter
  • Dekel Tsur
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2909)

Abstract

We investigate the problem of routing traffic through a congested network in an environment of non-cooperative users. We use the worst-case coordination ratio suggested by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou to measure the performance degradation due to the lack of a centralized traffic regulating authority. We provide a full characterization of the worst-case coordination ratio in the restricted assignment and unrelated parallel links models. In particular, we quantify the tradeoff between the ”negligibility” of the traffic controlled by each user and the coordination ratio. We analyze both pure and mixed strategies systems and identify the range where their performance is similar.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Tight Bound Link Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Baruch Awerbuch
    • 1
  • Yossi Azar
    • 2
  • Yossi Richter
    • 2
  • Dekel Tsur
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceJohns Hopkins UniversityBaltimore
  2. 2.School of Computer ScienceTel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael

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