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Kreditderivate als Ursache der globalen Finanzkrise: Systemfehler oder unglücklicher Zufall?

  • Daniel Mügge

Zusammenfassung

Es ist weithin anerkannt, dass Kreditderivate in der gegenwärtigen Finanzkrise eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt haben (Hellwig 2008; Kragt 2008; Morris 2008; Wray 2008). Weit weniger klar hingegen ist, wie sich der kometenhafte Aufstieg dieser Finanzprodukte verstehen lässt, und welche treibenden Kräfte dahinter stehen. Eine Antwort auf diese Frage hilft nicht nur, die Krisendynamik selbst besser zu verstehen. Sie kann auch Aufschluss darüber geben, inwieweit die Krise in langfristige Umwälzungen der Gesellschaft und der Weltwirtschaft eingebettet ist. Zusammengefasst stellt sich die Frage wie folgt: Beobachten wir eine Krise in der Weltwirtschaft oder etwa eine Krise der Weltwirtschaft selbst? Anders gefragt, können wir diese Krise als getrieben von den inneren Widersprüchen und inhärenten Grenzen des Kapitalismus verstehen?

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Copyright information

© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Mügge

There are no affiliations available

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