Umverteilungsbarrieren. Technische Probleme ökonomischer Gleichheit

  • Adam Przeworski
Chapter

Dass Demokratie nicht nur politische, sondern auch ökonomische Gleichheit fördern soll, ist eine unwiderstehliche intuitive Überzeugung. Demokratien haben es jedoch mit ökonomischen Systemen zu tun, in denen Märkte die Verteilung der meisten Ressourcen regeln, und Märkte (re-)generieren ständig Ungleichheit. Deshalb sind wir immer wieder überrascht festzustellen, im welchem Maße die Demokratie kompatibel ist mit ökonomischer Ungleichheit. Obwohl für diese Tatsache nahezu jede erdenkliche Erklärung schon vorgeschlagen wurde, zielt dieser Beitrag darauf ab, eine weitere, ausschließlich „technische“ Erklärung hinzuzufügen. Ungleichheit zu reduzieren ist, so mein Argument, ein schwieriges Unterfangen. Es stimmt zwar, dass bereits generiertes Einkommen durch das fiskalische System – also durch Steuern und Transferleistungen – umverteilt werden kann, aber dieser Mechanismus der Angleichung von Einkommen ist höchst ineffizient.

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© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH 2009

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  • Adam Przeworski

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