Corporate Governance: Eine kritische Rekonstruktion der Grundlagen, Anwendungen und Entwicklungen aus soziologischer Sicht

  • Ulrich Jürgens
Chapter

Auszug

Corporate-Governance-Fragen rühren an den Grundfesten (markt-)wirtschaftlicher Ordnung. Im Zentrum steht die Frage nach der Rolle, die dem Privateigentum bei der — klassisch ausgedrückt — Entwicklung der gesellschaftlichen Produktivkräfte und der Verteilung der erwirtschafteten Erträge durch Unternehmen zukommt. Insoweit bewegt sich jedwede Diskussion über Corporate Governance auf einem hochsensiblen, konfliktreichen sowie durch starke Institutionen und Akteure abgesicherten Terrain.

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Copyright information

© VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ulrich Jürgens
    • 1
  1. 1.Fachbereich Politik- und SozialwissenschaftenFreien Universität BerlinGermany

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