Abstract
This chapter considers the role of perception in petroleum engineering. Specifically, it looks at data analysis practices in geological surveying, wellbore navigation, directional drilling and related techniques. It begins with a familiar argument in the philosophy of science that there are no stable, non-stipulative grounds for distinguishing between ordinary cases of perception and cases where the perceptual system includes microscopes. It extends this claim to the use of gyroscopes and the data they generate. Finally, it explores the implications of this form of perception for the idea of responsible analysis.
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Notes
- 1.
For an extended analysis of the relationship between scientific and engineering knowledge see Kant and Kerr (2018).
- 2.
The tenuous distinction between cognitive systems ‘inside the skin and skull’ and non-cognitive systems ‘outside the skin and skull’ has already been questioned and debated thoroughly in Clark and Chalmers (1998) and subsequent literature. In a similar vein, I propose that the well log (the graphically represented data drawn from the gyroscope tool) extends ordinary unaided perception in a comparable way to how the notebook of Otto extends his ordinary unaided memory. Kerr and Gelfert (2014) considers what it would mean for scientific evidence to be extended and Kerr (2017) considers evidence in engineering.
- 3.
- 4.
Consider for example a typical account of perception outlined by Miller (2000).
- 5.
Whether someone born blind and who has learnt to distinguish and name spheres and cubes by touch would be able to distinguish and name these objects by sight if he became able to see was a question posed to John Locke by William Molyneux in 1688. Locke speculated, correctly, that such a person would not. See Degenaar and Lokhorst (2010) and Gallagher (2005). For examples of problems recovering eyesight see the case of Michael May in Bower (2003).
- 6.
This is but one option available in solving an estimation problem viz. the problem that our perceptual and cognitive system is supposed to solve. I have chosen to focus on this option as a potential explanation or framework for how our sensory system deals with ambiguous sensory information but note here that we need not necessarily adopt this exact approach.
- 7.
- 8.
Whilst this paper focuses on the epistemology of tools used in these practises, Kerr (2014) focuses on their ontology, providing a reference-based case study.
- 9.
Although the philosopher in me is inclined to ask if, like Descartes, they wondered whether the wax was the same when it came out as it was when it went in. And, in many ways, it is not: the wax now bears information, a source of knowledge, an inscription or representation of well inclination.
- 10.
For more of my research on mud-pulse telemetry see Sur and Kerr (2019).
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Kerr, E. (2020). Seeing the Turn: Microscopes, Gyroscopes, and Responsible Analysis in Petroleum Engineering. In: Beck, B., Kühler, M. (eds) Technology, Anthropology, and Dimensions of Responsibility. Techno:Phil – Aktuelle Herausforderungen der Technikphilosophie , vol 1. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04896-7_6
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