Außenwirtschaft und Weltwirtschaft

Politisch-institutionelle Determinanten der Außenwirtschaftsorientierung in Entwicklungsländern
  • Christian W. Martin
Chapter
Part of the Uni-Taschenbücher / Probleme der Politik book series

Zusammenfassung

Noch vor wenigen Jahren musste in Europa mit Fragen, gar Durchsuchungen rechnen, wer von einem Staat in den anderen wechselte. Die Grenze war deutlich spürbar, und das Interesse der Grenzbeamten richtete sich nicht nur auf die Einreise unerwünschter Personen, sondem mehr noch auf die illegale Einfuhr von Gütern, für die der jeweilige Staat einen Zoll zu erheben für angemessen erachtete. Mit der Verwirklichung des Europäischen Binnenmarktes und der Unterzeichung des Schengener Abkommens fielen diese Grenzen zwischen den meisten Staaten der Europäischen Union. Doch genügt eine Reise in die Schweiz, um eventuell mit der Frage konfron- üert zu werden, ob man deklaradonspflichdge Waren mit sich führe. Und wer gar versucht, einen Koffer mit Bargeld über die Grenze nach Liechtenstein zu bringen, dem ist das Interesse der Zoll- und Steuerbehörden des Ausreiselandes sicher.

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© Leske + Budrich, Opladen 2003

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  • Christian W. Martin

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