Reduzierte Demokratietheorien im Schatten des Zweiten Weltkriegs

Vgl. Kapitel VII, § 5.Google Scholar

Hobsbawm 1995, S. 121.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 125.Google Scholar

Vgl. Leibholz 1933, S. 58.Google Scholar

„Vor allem hat das Bewußtsein von dem Verlust der stets stillschweigend vorausgesetzten, metaphysischen Grundlagen der parlamentarisch-liberalen Demokratie in den verschiedenen Ländern zu einer Wiederbelebung der politischen Metaphysik und einer Erneuerung der Politik aus dem Glauben geführt. Und zwar findet dieses Streben nach einem Eingebettetsein in einem neuen Absoluten und Objektiven nicht nur in politischen Parteien und Bewegungen, sondern auch in den die Parteien überschneidenden Querverbindungen seinen Niederschlag wie etwa in der positiven Bewertung des bündischen Prinzips als einer neuen Form schicksalhaften, bodenständigen Gemeinschaftslebens, der freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst- und Siedlungsbewegung. Diese neue politische Glaubensbewegung, in deren Zeichen man nicht nur bei uns die Welt heute neu formen will, orientiert sich in erster Linie, wenn man in diesem Zusammenhang von dem proletarischen Mythus und dem revolutionären Glauben an Klassenkampf und Generalstreik in dem etwa von Proudhon, Bakunin und Sorel entwickelten Sinne absieht, an den Gemeinschaftsphänomenen Staat und Nation“ (Leibholz 1933, S. 55f).Google Scholar

Schmitt 1991, S. 89.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 88.Google Scholar

Leibholz 1933, S. 58.Google Scholar

Hobsbawm 1995, S. 146.Google Scholar

Ritter 1962, S. 3.Google Scholar

Vgl. Mannheim 1958. Die deutsche Übersetzung wurde verglichen mit Mannheim 1951.Google Scholar

Mannheim 1958, S. 3.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 52.Google Scholar

Ebd.Google Scholar

Ebd.Google Scholar

Ebd.Google Scholar

Ebd.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 55.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 58.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 58f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 62.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 63.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 69.Google Scholar

“Democratic control must guard against another danger: mass psychology. (…) The danger of mass democracy only arises when unorganized masses are exposed to incalculable waves of emotion, especially in times of crises. The more the rhythm of the trade cycle threatens the security of the masses in times of depression the more suggestible they become, and under certain conditions they will even surrender their highest privileges, particularly their right to democracy, in a passion of excitement. The fathers of democracy had this danger constantly in mind, and usually made it difficult to change the constitution itself, providing acid tests to prevent the alteration of the system under stress of an emotional mood or of momentary propaganda” (Mannheim 1951, S. 335).Google Scholar

Mannheim 1958, S. 85. “The principle of democracy, which is that all social classes shall be politically active, thus acquires a pecular dual function. In the conflict between functionally rational behaviour and mass psychosis — to which we alluded before — the democratizing process acted as a kind of social elevator. Every now and again it raised the pent-up irrationalities and uncontrolled impulses of the crowd to the level of the more individualized, reserved, and rational élites of society, e.g. in its attitude to war. Now, in the tensions between honesty in everyday life and the dual morality of ‘reason of state’ — the democratizing process is like a lift which brings down from the upper to the lower social layers the cynism with which, in extreme cases, the former defended the immorality of war” (Mannheim 1951, S. 72f).Google Scholar

Vgl. Kapitel V, § 4.Google Scholar

Vgl. a.a.O., § 7.Google Scholar

Vgl. Mannheim 1958, S. 120f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 102f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 5.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 7.Google Scholar

“Fortunately, modem society has (…) mechanisms at its disposal if only it will use them. For elections may well be regarded as a guide only, as an ultimate indication to the consulting bodies who have to carry out the public’s wishes. In this way only the ultimate direction of public affairs is to be treated as a political matter and would remain an emotional issue, whereas as a general rule the translation of this policy into practice would gradually become a purely technical matter” (Mannheim 1951, S. 360).Google Scholar

Mannheim 1958, S.418f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 292f.Google Scholar

“Vital as it is for a democracy that people should make their own contribution to the direction of public affairs, it is equally important that these contributions should merely serve as an indication to the Government, but should not in their crude state be immediately put into practice. Much depends on whether our new social techniques are capable of sublimation and incorporating these genuine impulses of the community in the social order” (Mannheim 1951, S. 360).Google Scholar

Mannheim 1958, S. 393.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 400f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 306.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 108.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 132.Google Scholar

Ebd.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 385.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 355.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 388.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 390.Google Scholar

Vgl. Kapitel VII, § 5.Google Scholar

Mannheim 1958, S. 414.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 418.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 419.Google Scholar

Vgl. Schumpeter 1975. Die deutsche Übersetzung wurde verglichen mit Schumpeter 1944.Google Scholar

Schumpeter 1975, S. 11.Google Scholar

Zu Schumpeters Ansatz vgl. neuerdings auch Lenk 1991, S. 947–949; Waschkuhn 1998, S. 29–36; Pohl/Buchstein 1999, S. 72–73 sowie Schmidt 2000, S. 197–212.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 397–426.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 427–450.Google Scholar

Vgl. Kapitel III, § 3.Google Scholar

Vgl. Kapitel I, §§ 2–4.Google Scholar

Schumpeter 1975, S. 397.Google Scholar

Ebd.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 397.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 399.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 400.Google Scholar

Ebd.Google Scholar

“During the second half of the last century, the idea of the human personality that is a homogeneous unit and the idea of a definite will that is the prime mover of action have been steadily fading -even before the times of Théodule Ribot and of Sigmund Freud. In particular, these ideas have been increasingly discounted in the field of social sciences where the importance of the extra-rational and irrational element in our behavior has been receiving more and more attention, witness Pareto’s Mind and Society” (Schumpeter 1944, S. 256).Google Scholar

Schumpeter bezieht sich explizit auf Gustav Le Bons Psychology des foules. “By showing up, though overstressing, the realities of human behavior when under influence of agglomeration — in particular the sudden disappearance, in a state of excitement, of moral restraints and civilized modes of thinking and feeling, the sudden eruption of primitive impulses, infantilisms and criminal propensities — he made us face gruesome facts that everybody knew but nobody wished to see and he thereby dealt a serious blow to the picture of man’s nature which underlies the classical doctrine of democracy and democratic folklore about revolutions” (Schumpeter 1944, S. 257).Google Scholar

Schumpeter 1975, S. 408.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S.416f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 418.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S.418f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 384. “Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain typ of institutional arrangement for arriving at political — legislative and administrative — decisions and hence incaple of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions. And this must be the starting point of any attempt at defining it” (Schumpeter 1944, S. 242).Google Scholar

Schumpeter 1975, S. 390.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 452. “First of all, according to the view we have taken, democracy does not mean and cannot mean that people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms ‘people’ and ‘rule’. Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them. But since they might decide this also in entirely undemocratic ways, we have had to narrow our definition by adding a further criterion identifying the democratic method, viz., free competition among would-be leaders for the vote of the electorate” (Schumpeter 1944, S. 284f).Google Scholar

Schumpeter 1975, S. 390.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 428f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 429.Google Scholar

Ebd.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 429f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 430f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 431.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 432.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 432f.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 453.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 454.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 453f.Google Scholar

Vgl. a.a.O., S. 461.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 462.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 463.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 474f. “Industrial or Economie Democracy is a phrase that figures in so many quasiutopias that it has retained very little precise meaning. Mainly, I think, it means two things: first, the trade-union rule over industrial relations; second, democratization of the monarchic factory by work-ermen’s representation on boards or other devices calculated to secure them influence on the introduction of technological improvements, business policy in general and, of course, discipline in the plant in particular, including methods of ‘hiring and firing’. Profit-sharing is a nostrum of a subgroup of schemes. It is safe to say that much of this economic democracy will vanish into thin air in a socialist regime. Nor is this so offensive as it may sound. For many of the interests this kind of democracy is intended to safeguard will then cease to exist” (Schumpeter 1944, S. 300, FN). Schumpeter lehnte also mit dieser Argumentation das auf Rudolf Hilferdings Konzept des „organisierten Kapitalismus“ beruhende Modell der Wirtschaftsdemokratie ab, das weitgehende Mitbestimmungsrechte der Arbeitnehmer und Sozialisierungen vorsah. Vgl. zur Wirtschaftsdemokratie in den ersten Republiken in Deutschland und Österreich grundlegend Euchner 2000, S. 304–308.Google Scholar

Vgl. a.a.O., S. 465.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 468.Google Scholar

Bachrach 1967, S. 34f.Google Scholar

Vgl. Bell 1965.Google Scholar

Bachrach 1967, S. 35.Google Scholar

Vgl. Berelson u.a. 1962.Google Scholar

Vgl. a.a.O., S. 220: „Overlaying the base of objective observation is the distortion effect-distortion in harmony with political predispositions. As Schumpeter says, ‘Information and arguments in political matters will ‘register’ only if they link up with the citizen’s preconceived ideas’„.Google Scholar

„If there is one characteristic for a democratic system (besides the ballot itself) that is theoretically required, it is the capacity for and the practice of discussion. (…) In this instance there was little true discussion between the candidates, little in the newspaper commentary, little between the voters and the offical representatives, some within the electorate. On the grass-roots level there was more talk than debate, and, at least inferentially, the talk had important effects upon voting, in reinforcing or activating the partisans if not inconverting the opposition“(Berelson u.a. 1962, S. 307f).Google Scholar

Vgl. a.a.O., S. 306–331.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 308: „Now when a person buys something or makes other decisions of daily life, there are direct and immediate consequences for him. But for the bulk of the American people the voting decision is not followed by any direct, immediate, visible personal consequences. Most voters, organized or unorganized, are not in a position to foresee the distant and indirect consequences for themselves, let alone the society. The ballot is cast, and for most people that is the end of it. If their side is defeated, ‘it doesn’t really matter’„.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 314: „Lack of interest by some people is not without its benefits, too. (…) Extreme interest goes with extreme partisanship and might culminate in rigid fanaticism that could destroy democratic processes if generalized throughout the community. Low affect toward the election — not caring much — underlies the resolution of many political problems; votes can be resolved into a two-party split instead of fragmented into many parties (the splinter parties of the left, for example, splinter because their advocates are too interested in politics). Low interest provides maneuvering room for political shifts necessary for a complex society in a period of rapid change“.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 322.Google Scholar

Vgl. Lipset 1963.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 27: „Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office. This definition, abstracted largely from the work of Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber, implies a number of specific conditions: (1) a ‘political formula’ or body of beliefs specifying which institutions — political parties, a free press, and so forth — are legitimate (accepted as proper by all); (2) one set of political leaders in office; and (3) one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office“.Google Scholar

Ebd. Ebd.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 28.Google Scholar

Vgl. Kornhauser 1965.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 130: „Democratie critics (…) stress the opposition between liberty and authority, and consequently the need to restrain and limit authority. Furthermore, they assert that liberty without democracy means merely the protection of the privileges of the few. Democracy is essentially an institutional procedure for changing leadership by free competition for the popular vote. The existence of free competition for leadership does not necessarily guarantee liberty, but in its absence there is less chance for liberty — especially freedom of expression and association“.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 230: „However, democracy entails a fundamental restriction on the autonomy of elites, especially in politics. This restriction is twofold: first, elites will be restricted by one another in that they will be constrained to compete with one another for leadership; and secondly, elites will be restricted by non-elites in that they will be constrained to compete for the people’s votes. An implication of this conception of democracy also involves a restriction on non-elites: the electorate will accept the leadership that they have selected, until the time when it may be rejected according to duly constituted procedure“.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 425f.Google Scholar

Vgl. Downs 1968. Die deutsche Übersetzung wurde verglichen mit Downs 1957.Google Scholar

Vgl. zu Downs’ Ansatz Bachrach 1967, S. 22–39 sowie Fetscher 1973, S.48f und neuerdings auch Pohl/Buchstein 1999, S. 78–80 sowie Schmidt 2000, S. 212–226.Google Scholar

Wildenmann 1968, S. X.Google Scholar

Downs 1968, S. 29, FN 11.Google Scholar

In Deutschland wurde dieses Modell sehr früh rezipiert von Philipp Herder-Dorneich. Vgl. Herder-Dorneich 1959.Google Scholar

Downs 1968, S. 28. „We assume that every individual, though rational, is also selfish. (…) Throughout our model, we assume that every agent acts in accordance with this view of human nature. Thus, whenever we speak of rational behavior, we always mean rational behavior directed primarily towards selfish ends“(Downs 1957, S. 27).Google Scholar

Downs 1968, S. 11. „Our model is based on the assumption that every government seeks to maximize political support. We further assume that the government exists in a democratic society where periodic elections are held, that its primary goal is reelection, and that election is the goal of those parties now out of power. At each election, the party which receives the most votes (though not necessarily a majority) controls the entire government until the next election, with no intermediate votes either by the people as a whole or by a parliament. The governing party thus has unlimited freedom of action, within the bounds of the constitution“(Downs 1957, S. 11f).Google Scholar

Downs 1968, S. 35. „The benefits voters consider in making their decisions are streams of utility derived from government activity. Actually, this definition is circular, because we define utility as a measure of benefits in a citizen’s mind which he uses to decide among alternatives courses of action. Given several mutually exclusive alternatives, a rational man always takes the one which yields him the highest utility, ceteribus paribus: i.e., he acts to his own greatest benefit“(Downs 1957, S. 36f).Google Scholar

Downs 1968, S. 231. „A necessary prerequisite to rational political action is the prefocussing of attention upon the differential areas of decision. This end is accomplished by the providers of political information acting for various reasons of self-interest. (…) In complex cultures, an essential part of political decision-making is delegation to others of several steps in the process. Nearly all data procurement and much factual analysis are done by specialized agencies rather than decision-makers themselves. By utilizing such agencies, citizens can cut their own costs enormously“(Downs 1957, S. 237).Google Scholar

Downs 1968, S. 231.Google Scholar

Vgl. hierzu Waschkuhn 1998, S. 36–44 sowie Schmidt 2000, S. 209–212.Google Scholar

Vgl. Bachrach 1970. Die deutsche Übersetzung wurde verglichen mit Bachrach 1969.Google Scholar

„Let us transport ourselves into a hypothetical country that, in a democratic way, practices the persecution of Christians, the burning of witches, and the slaughtering of Jews. We should certainly not approve of these practices on the ground that they have been decided on according to the rules of democratic procedure. But the crucial question is: would we approve of the democratic constitution itself that produced such results in preference to a non-democratic one that would avoid them?“(Schumpeter 1944, S. 242).Google Scholar

Bachrach 1970, S. 32.Google Scholar

A.a.O., S. 3 If. „Thus by the reduction of democracy to a political method on the strength of what Schumpeter considered simple logic and common sense, the way became open to modifying and qualifying democracy in the interest, for example, of protecting liberty, without undue embarassment and equivocation. It is quite different, in other words, to profess uncompromising loyalty to a political philosophy based upon the dignity and worth of man than give allegiance to a political method that is expected to protect and strengthen individual liberty, justice, and the like. Without this masterful stroke on Schumpeter’s part, it is doubtful that elitism and democracy could have developed as they have into a congenial and close relationship. For in the absence of his version of democratic theory, on-going democratic systems, which require little more of the great majority of people than to choose periodically between competing leaders, would be continually vulnerable to attack for failing to provide the political means and climate which stimulate and heighten the development of a free people. But such criticism is inappropriate, and misfires when applied to a political method that is committed to the achievement of no overriding objectives or ideals“(Bachrach 1969, S. 19).Google Scholar

Im folgenden beziehe ich mich auf Saage 1998, S. 24–26.Google Scholar

Downs 1968, S. 262. „When no one votes, democracy collapses. Yet if everyone who is not indifferent votes, in the next election each will abstain, since his ballot had so little effect previously (i.e., when everyone voted). Thus if we assume all men think allke, democracy seems unable to function rationally. What rule can we posit within the framework of our model to show how rational men can arrive at different conclusions though viewing the same situation? The answer consist of two parts: 1. Rational men in a democracy are motivated to some extent by a sense of social responsibility independent of their own short-run gains and losses. 2. If we view such responsibility as one part of the return from voting, it is possible that the cost of voting is outweighed by its returns for some but not all rational men“(Downs 1957, S. 267f). Zur Kritik an Downs vgl. auch Fetscher 1973, S. 49–62.Google Scholar

Fukuyama 1992, S. 430.Google Scholar

Meisel 1958, S. 286f.Google Scholar

Mosca 1950, S. 22f.Google Scholar

Bachrach 1970, S. 29.Google Scholar