Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Number of Participants in the Software Crowdsourcing Contest

  • Pengcheng Peng
  • Chenqi MouEmail author
  • Wei-Tek Tsai
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11110)


In this paper a game theoretic model of multiple players is established to relate the reward from the outsourcer and the number of participants in the software crowdsourcing contest in the winner-take-all mode via Nash equilibria of the game. We show how to construct the payoff function of each participant in this game by computing his expected probability of winning sequential pairwise challenges. Preliminary experimental results with our implementations are provided to illustrate the relationships between the reward and the number of participants for three typical participant compositions.


Software crowdsourcing Game theory Nash equilibrium Payoff function 



The first author wishes to thank his supervisor, Professor Dongming Wang, for his support and encouragement.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LMIB – School of Mathematics and Systems Science / Beijing Advanced Innovation Center for Big Data and Brain ComputingBeihang UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.School of Computer Science and EngineeringBeihang UniversityBeijingChina
  3. 3.School of Computing, Informatics, and Decision Systems EngineeringArizona State UniversityTempeUSA

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