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Timing-Based Anomaly Detection in SCADA Networks

  • Chih-Yuan Lin
  • Simin Nadjm-Tehrani
  • Mikael Asplund
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10707)

Abstract

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that operate our critical infrastructures are subject to increased cyber attacks. Due to the use of request-response communication in polling, SCADA traffic exhibits stable and predictable communication patterns. This paper provides a timing-based anomaly detection system that uses the statistical attributes of the communication patterns. This system is validated with three datasets, one generated from real devices and two from emulated networks, and is shown to have a False Positive Rate (FPR) under 1.4%. The tests are performed in the context of three different attack scenarios, which involve valid messages so they cannot be detected by whitelisting mechanisms. The detection accuracy and timing performance are adequate for all the attack scenarios in request-response communications. With other interaction patterns (i.e. spontaneous communications), we found instead that 2 out of 3 attacks are detected.

Keywords

SCADA Industrial Control System (ICS) Anomaly detection Traffic periodicity 

Notes

Acknowledgement

This work was completed within RICS: the research centre on Resilient Information and Control Systems (www.rics.se) financed by Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The authors would also like to thank the support by Modio.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer and Information ScienceLinköping UniversityLinköpingSweden

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