Practical Cryptographic Data Integrity Protection with Full Disk Encryption

Conference paper
Part of the IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology book series (IFIPAICT, volume 529)


Full Disk Encryption (FDE) has become a widely used security feature. Although FDE can provide confidentiality, it generally does not provide cryptographic data integrity protection. We introduce an algorithm-agnostic solution that provides both data integrity and confidentiality protection at the disk sector layer. Our open-source solution is intended for drives without any special hardware extensions and is based on per-sector metadata fields implemented in software. Our implementation has been included in the Linux kernel since the version 4.12.



The authors thank Arno Wagner, John Strunk, Ondrej Mosnáček, Virgil Gligor and Ric Wheeler for valuable comments.


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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Red Hat CzechBrnoCzech Republic
  2. 2.Faculty of InformaticsMasaryk UniversityBrnoCzech Republic

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