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M-ORAM Revisited: Security and Construction Updates

  • Karin Sumongkayothin
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11125)

Abstract

Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM) [4] was introduced in regard to secure the access patterns seen by a server when the data have been retrieved. Matrix based ORAM (M-ORAM) [5] is one of ORAM constructions. It has been introduced in the matrix data structure format and can achieve O(1) for both bandwidth overhead and computation complexity. With the impressive performance results; however, the given security proof is not well defined. We therefore revisit the paper to give a new proper proof method to construct the access sequence which is statically indistinguishable from random accesses. In addition according to our new security proof, M-ORAM has a security weakness in a specific circumstance. Hence, the improved M-ORAM construction which can solve the problem is also introduced.

Notes

Acknowledgement

This research project was partially supported by Faculty of Information and Communication Technology, Mahidol University.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Infornation and Communication TechnologyMahidol University Nakhon PathomPhutthamonthonThailand

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