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Deriving and Formalising Safety and Security Requirements for Control Systems

  • Elena Troubitsyna
  • Inna VistbakkaEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11093)

Abstract

Safety-critical control systems become increasingly open and interconnected. However, there is still a lack of the techniques that enable an integrated analysis of safety and security requirements. In this paper, we propose an approach that allows the designers to derive and formalise safety and security requirements in a structured systematic way. To elicit both types of the requirements, we adapt and integrate traditional safety and security analysis techniques. To formally specify and verify them, we rely on Event-B framework. The framework allows us to develop a complex specification of system behaviour in presence of both accidental faults and security attacks and analyse mutual interdependencies between safety and security requirements.

Keywords

Formal modelling Safety analysis Data flow Event-B Refinement Safety-critical systems Security 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.KTHStockholmSweden
  2. 2.Åbo Akademi UniversityTurkuFinland

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