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A Model-Based Safety Analysis of Dependencies Across Abstraction Layers

  • Christoph DropmannEmail author
  • Eike Thaden
  • Mario Trapp
  • Denis Uecker
  • Rakshith Amarnath
  • Leandro Avila da Silva
  • Peter Munk
  • Markus Schweizer
  • Matthias Jung
  • Rasmus Adler
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11093)

Abstract

Identifying and mitigating possible failure propagation from one safety-critical application to another through common infrastructural components is a challenging task. Examples of such dependencies across software-stack layers (e.g., between application and middleware layer) are common causes and failure propagation scenarios in which a failure of one software component propagates to another software component through shared services and/or common computational resources. To account for this, safety standards demand freedom from interference in order to control failure propagation between mixed-critical software components. Safety analysis is typically focused on one abstraction layer, while robustness tests try to find failure propagation paths across abstraction layers. To this end, this paper presents a model-based failure propagation analysis combining failure propagation within and across abstraction layers. A classification of dependencies in combination with fault trees is used to perform a model-based dependency analysis. In addition, a novel modeling technique for integrating failure propagation aspects resulting from shared services and resources is presented. The analysis was used to carry out an early safety assessment of a real-world automotive redundancy mechanism within an integrated architecture. The results show that the method improved reusability and modularity, and made it easier to estimate failure propagation issues, including possible violations of freedom from interference within an integrated system.

Keywords

Software and system safety Interferences Safety analysis 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We acknowledge financial support for this work from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the projects “ARAMiS II” (01IS16025) and “Software Campus” (01IS12053). All responsibility for the content remains with the authors.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christoph Dropmann
    • 1
    Email author
  • Eike Thaden
    • 2
  • Mario Trapp
    • 1
  • Denis Uecker
    • 1
  • Rakshith Amarnath
    • 2
  • Leandro Avila da Silva
    • 1
  • Peter Munk
    • 2
  • Markus Schweizer
    • 2
  • Matthias Jung
    • 1
  • Rasmus Adler
    • 1
  1. 1.Fraunhofer IESEKaiserslauternGermany
  2. 2.Robert Bosch GmbHRenningenGermany

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