Advertisement

McDowell, Hegel and Allison’s Reading of Kant

  • Tom Rockmore
Chapter
Part of the Studies in German Idealism book series (SIGI, volume 20)

Abstract

This paper will consider John McDowell’s reading of Kant and Hegel through his reaction to Allison’s reading of Kant. Kant is obviously one of the very few key modern figures. In a sense, with respect to Kant there is a before and after. Many later thinkers, including Hegel and McDowell, react indirectly or even directly to Kant. McDowell’s claim that the real shows itself commits him, as it committed Heidegger and others, to an anti- or at least non-constructivist reading of the critical philosophy. Left unclear is whether he has in mind empirical realism, which is defended by all the German idealists including Kant, or metaphysical realism that, in my view, all of them reject. Since McDowell’s reading of Hegel depends on his reading of Kant, it will be useful to concentrate on the latter. And since his reading of Kant apparently depends on his reaction to Allison’s interpretation of Kant, I will focus on that particular approach in his writings. I should indicate at the outset that my interest is less to describe the views of McDowell, Kant, and Hegel, though it includes that task as well, than to determine what they contribute to our views of knowledge, or, following Kantian terminology, cognition (Erkennen). I will be arguing that Kant, whose position is ambiguous, advances two incompatible views of cognition, and that McDowell defends the one that Kant later wisely rejects, but that Hegel defends the one Kant later put forward and that we should now also be defending.

References

  1. Brandom, Robert. 2000. Articulating Reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Burnyeat, Myles F. 2012. Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed. In Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, vol. I, 245–275. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Davidson, Donald. 1991. Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Dunham, Jeremy, Iain Hamilton, and Sean Watson. 2011. Idealism: The History of a Philosophy. Montreal: McGill-Queens University.Google Scholar
  5. Fichte, Johan Gottlieb. 1982. Science of Knowledge. Ed. and Trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Kant, Immanuel. 1967. Lectures on Metaphysics. Trans. K. Ameriks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  7. ———. 1997. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Ed. and Trans. G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  8. ———. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. and Trans. P. Guyer and A.W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Pippin, Robert. 1989. Hegel’s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Putnam, Hilary. 2012. Corresponding with Reality. In Philosophy in the Age of Science, ed. M. De Caro and D. Macarthur, 77–94. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Rockmore, Tom. 2016. German Idealism as Constructivism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Russell, Bertrand. 1945. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
  13. Strawson, Peter F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London: Methuen.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyPeking UniversityBeijingChina

Personalised recommendations