Advertisement

Reconciling Logics of Organizational Behaviour in the EU Public Consultations

  • Adriana BuneaEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

Public consultations are an important communication channel between policymakers and interest organizations across systems and levels of governance and constitute a key venue for lobbying and interest representation. The European Union implements one of the most elaborated and complex systems of stakeholder consultations. This consultation regime constitutes an institutional constraint that structures stakeholders’ organizational and lobbying behavior. This is particularly relevant for European level associations, which aim to perform various roles within EU policymaking but whose presence and function in Brussels are challenged by a constant increase in the direct lobbying of policymakers by individual interest organizations. In relation to this, this study asks: to what extent and in what way do public consultations support the lobbying activities of European associations in EU policymaking? The study argues that public consultations support the European associations’ lobbying by offering them a venue in which they can successfully combine their ‘logic of membership’ with their ‘logic of influence’ in pursuit of their lobbying goals. The argument is supported with examples and evidence from five public consultations conducted by the European Commission in the environmental policy and two consultations on reforming the EU Better Regulation policy.

References

  1. Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. R. (1992). Competitive lobbying for a legislator’s vote. Social Choice and Welfare, 9, 229–257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Austen-Smith, D., & Wright, J. R. (1994). Counteractive lobbying. American Journal of Political Science, 38, 25–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bennett, R. J. (1999). Business routes of influence in Brussels: Exploring the choice of direct representation. Political Studies, 47(2), 240–257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Berhagen, P., & Mitchel, N. (2009). The determinants of direct corporate lobbying. European Union Politics, 10(2), 155–176.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Beyers, J. (2004). Voice and access: Political practices of European interest associations. European Union Politics, 5(2), 211–240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Beyers, J. (2008). Policy issues, organizational format and the political strategies of interest organizations. West European Politics, 31, 1188–1211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Bouwen, P. (2002). Corporate lobbying in the European Union: The logic of access. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(3), 365–390.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Bouwen, P. (2007). Competing for consultation: Civil Society and conflict between the European Commission and the European Parliament. West European Politics, 30(2), 265–284.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bouwen, P. (2009). The European Commission. In D. Coen & J. Richardson (Eds.), Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, actors and issues (pp. 19–39). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Broscheid, A., & Coen, D. (2003). Insider and outsider lobbying of the European Commission. European Union Politics, 4(2), 165–189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Bunea, A. (2013). Issues, preferences and ties: Determinants of EU interest groups’ preference attainment in the Environmental Policy Area. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(4), 552–570.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Bunea, A. (2014). Explaining interest groups’ articulation of policy preferences in the European Commission’s Open Consultations: An analysis of the Environmental Policy Area. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(6), 1221–1241.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Bunea, A. (2015). Sharing ties and preferences: Stakeholders’ position alignments in the European Commission’s open consultation. European Union Politics, 16(2), 281–299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Bunea, A. (2017). Designing stakeholder consultations: Reinforcing or alleviating bias in the European Union system of governance? European Journal of Political Research, 56(1), 46–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Bunea, A., & Ibenskas, R. (2015). Quantitative text analysis and the study of EU lobbying and interest groups. European Union Politics, 16(3), 429–455.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Coen, D. (1997). The evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1), 91–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Cowles, M. G. (2002). Large firms and the transformation of EU business associations: A historical perspective. In J. Greenwood (Ed.), The effectiveness of EU business associations (pp. 64–78). Basingstoke: Palgrave.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Crombez, C. (2002). Information, lobbying and the legislative process in the European Union. European Union Politics, 3(1), 7–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Grant, W. (2002). The importance of institutions to associations: Evidence from the cross-national organisation of business interests project. In J. Greenwood (Ed.), The effectiveness of EU business associations (pp. 53–63). Basingstoke: Palgrave.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Greenwood, J. (2002). EU interest groups and their members: When is membership a ‘collective action problem’? In V. Wright, R. Balme, & D. Chabanet (Eds.), Collective action and European integration (pp. 227–254). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Greenwood, J., & Webster, R. (2000). The governability of EU business associations. Journal of European Integration, 23(1), 63–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Greenwood, J., & Westgeest, A. (2002). Conclusions. In J. Greenwood (Ed.), The effectiveness of EU business associations (pp. 223–234). Basingstoke: Palgrave.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. McLaughlin, A., & Jordan, G. (1993). The rationality of lobbying in Europe: Why are Eurogroups so numerous and so weak? Some evidence from the car industry. In S. Mazey & J. Richardson (Eds.), Lobbying in the European Community (pp. 122–161). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  24. Michalowitz, I. (2004). Lobbying as a two way strategy: Interest intermediation or mutual instrumentalisation. In A. Warntjen & A. Wonka (Eds.), Governance in Europe: The role of interest groups (pp. 75–92). Baden Baden: Nomos.Google Scholar
  25. Potters, J., & Van Winden, F. (1990). Modelling political pressure as transmission of information. European Journal of Political Economy, 6(1), 61–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Potters, J., & Van Winden, F. (1992). Lobbying and asymmetric information. Public Choice, 74(3), 269–292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Quittkat, C. (2011). The European Commission’s online consultations: A success story? Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(3), 653–674.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Schmitter, P. C., & Streeck, W. (1981/1999). The organisation of business interests: Studying the associative action of business in advanced industrial societies. MPIfG Discussion Paper 99/1. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. Accessed October 6, 2014, from http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp99-1.pdf
  29. Skodvin, T., Gullberg, A. T., & Aakre, S. (2010). Target-group influence and political feasibility: The case of climate policy design in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(6), 854–873.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Thomson, R. (2009). Actor alignments in the European Union before and after enlargement. European Journal of Political Research, 48, 756–781.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Politics and International RelationsUniversity of SouthamptonSouthamptonUK

Personalised recommendations