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The Possibility and Fruitfulness of a Debate on the Principle of Non-contradiction

  • Luis Estrada-González
  • María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz
Chapter
Part of the Trends in Logic book series (TREN, volume 47)

Abstract

Five major stances on the problems of the possibility and fruitfulness of a debate on the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) are described: Detractors, Fierce supporters, Demonstrators, Methodologists and Calm supporters. We show what Calm supporters have to say on the other parties wondering about the possibility and fruitfulness of a debate on PNC. The main claim is that one can find all the elements of Calm supporters already in Aristotle’s works. In addition, we argue that the Aristotelian refutative strategy, originally used for dealing with detractors of PNC in Metaphysics, has wider implications for the possibility and fruitfulness of an up-to-date debate on PNC, at least in exhibiting some serious difficulties for the other parties.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the PAPIIT project IA401117 “Philosophical Aspects of Contra-Classical Logics”. We would like to thank Daniel Cohnitz, Alex Davies, Víctor Cantero, Maite Ezcurdia, Eduardo García-Ramírez, Tuomas Tahko and Pedro Stepanenko, as well as the audience at the conference Trends in Logic XVI, for their comments on previous incarnations of this paper, some of them known as “Kantham Priest vs. Aristot Lewis”. The anonymous referees deserve special mention for their extremely useful reports.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luis Estrada-González
    • 1
  • María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Philosophical Research, UNAMMexico CityMexico

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