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How to Reform EMU?

  • Pierre Schlosser
Chapter

Abstract

EMU’s post-crisis polity is unstable. This makes the euro a risky choice as the currency of European citizens. This chapter discusses ways to address this major challenge and reviews EMU polity’s reform prospects. It first sets out the crucial features of an additional sustained period of muddling-through and reveals the costly implications of the perpetuation of this status quo. Departing from muddling-through, the chapter then describes three competing medium term scenarios for the development of EMU’s polity: an executive technocracy, an intergovernmental confederation and democratic federalism. Having clearly spelled out the possible institutional directions that EU leaders could embark on, the chapter suggests three policy reform steps to make EMU sustainable, offers the ‘technology’ behind institutional settlement and provides the closing remarks of this book.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierre Schlosser
    • 1
  1. 1.European University InstituteFlorenceItaly

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