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Findings and Interpretation

  • Pierre Schlosser
Chapter

Abstract

The height of the crisis management coincided with the institutionalization of a fiscal centre, understood as an incipient and composite fiscal authority that runs across all EMU executive institutions without being embodied by any primus inter pares. The emergence of such a fiscal centre was strongly conditioned and constrained by the path-dependence of the EU’s past institutional modus operandi: an over-reliance on rules on the one hand and the empowerment of technocratic agencies on the other. In the absence of an EMU crisis management mechanism, the crisis acted as a catalyst for the development of common central fiscal capacities. Accordingly, the chapter summarizes the findings of this book and provides an interpretation of the convoluted trajectory that fiscal power centralization took during the euro crisis.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierre Schlosser
    • 1
  1. 1.European University InstituteFlorenceItaly

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