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Introduction

  • Pierre Schlosser
Chapter

Abstract

The euro crisis has dramatically impacted the institutional architecture of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The crisis propelled Europe towards an unprecedented and distinctive fiscal centralization trajectory. A unique form of fiscal authority has been institutionalized in the shadow of euro crisis management. Newly-centralized powers were not captured by the European Commission. Instead, powers have been fragmented and spread across both existing and new executive EMU bodies. After documenting this phenomenon, the chapter presents the key actors which embody Europe’s fiscal authority – the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup and reviews the relevant available literature. The chapter then explains how the data has been collected, specifies the book’s expected contributions and provides the roadmap of this book.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierre Schlosser
    • 1
  1. 1.European University InstituteFlorenceItaly

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