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Global Code: Power and the Weak Regulation of Cyberweapons

  • Tim StevensEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter renders explicit what is submerged in previous analyses of cyberweapons regulation and governance: the operations of power in shaping this field of politics and policy. It addresses nascent attempts to regulate cyberweapons and explores the operations of power in the global information-technological assemblage that shape their development, possession and use. First, a short preamble sets out the conceptual foundations of the chapter in terms of both regime theory and power analysis in International Relations. There follow four outline case studies, each focusing on an aspect of cyberweapons regulation and governance previously established as problems for the development of a global cyberweapons regime. The first concerns productive power and the role of the NATO Tallinn Manual Process in constructing cyberweapons as legitimate military instruments. The second is the role of US structural power in incentivising cyberweapons markets, which undermines multilateral attempts to regulate dual-use technologies associated with cyberweapons. The third examines the Internet as a source of institutional power, arguing that the design of the Internet provides affordances for cyberweapons. The fourth addresses compulsory power and diplomatic relations between the great powers, which resolve to differing interpretations of sovereignty that constrain the emergence of a global cyberweapons regime.

Keywords

Cybersecurity Cyberweapons Power Global governance Security regulation Regime Nonregime 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.King’s College LondonLondonUK

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