The International Financial System and the Role of Central Banks in the Great 2007–9 Recession and the ‘Monetary Peace’

Part of the Palgrave Studies in Democracy, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship for Growth book series (DIG)


This chapter examines the evolution of central banks as powerful institutions in the international economic system, and reviews the political and economic context of international policy cooperation since the ‘first globalization’ in 1876–1914. The chapter claims that central banks’ cooperation has led to a new paradigm of ‘monetary peace’ in the aftermath of the ‘Great Recession’ in 2007–9. Assuming that the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1930s has taught hard lessons to the world, this chapter examines the institutional arrangements that shaped monetary policy and led to the successful implementation of ‘monetary peace’ by the leading central banks (mainly Fed and ECB) following the Great Recession.


Central banks Institutions Great Recession 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Neapolis University PafosPafosCyprus
  2. 2.University of AthensAthensGreece

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