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Basic and Refined Nomic Truth Approximation by Evidence-Guided Belief Set Revision

  • Theo A. F. Kuipers
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 399)

Abstract

Straightforward theory revision, taking into account as effectively as possible the established nomic possibilities and, on their basis induced empirical laws, is conducive for nomic truth approximation. The question this paper asks is: is it possible to reconstruct the relevant theory revision steps, on the basis of incoming evidence, in the terms of so-called belief revision and, more specifically, in the terms of belief set revision, also called the AGM-approach? Assumin g exclusion theories, a positive answer will be given in two rounds, first for the case in which the initial theory is compatible with the established empirical laws, then for the case in which it is incompatible with at least one such a law.

Keywords

Theory revision Belief revision AGM-revision Nomic truth approximation Expansion Contraction Revision Structurelikeness 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Theo A. F. Kuipers
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Theoretical PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands

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