The Future of the Euro Area: The Possible Reforms

  • Jérôme Creel
  • Francesco Saraceno


Although the European Union (EU) is supposed to ensure the prosperity of its members, several member states have been going through a serious economic and social crisis. The organization of economic policies in the euro area is certainly far from optimal. Far-reaching institutional reforms are needed in order to meet a number of key aims: boost economic development, improve upward convergence, and increase stability. There is certainly no shortage of individual proposals on the table. It is helpful to group the proposals into two fundamental views, which have a contrasting philosophy and endorse quite different tools. The first view focuses on the compliance with agreed rules and places faith in market discipline to incentivize improved competitiveness and reduced public indebtedness. The second view highlights the requirements of solidarity and coordination between the EU Member States. While both views have their pros and cons, the ongoing process of reforms has left the euro area with minimal proposals by the Commission that do not clearly decide which of these two views would be the preferred one.


Eurozone budget Risk-sharing Market discipline Fiscal rules MIP 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.OFCE, Sciences PoParisFrance
  2. 2.ESCP EuropeParisFrance
  3. 3.LUISSRomeItaly

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