A Currency Democratically Shared Among Democracies
The trap in the debates about the European Union is to think about democracy at the EU level based on our own national democratic experiences. But the European political space is quite specific: it is composed of a multitude of peoples who are very open to each other, interacting massively together and thus subject to transnational conflicts of interest that need peaceful solutions. Democracy must therefore take a different form to take account of this specificity. The neologism “demoicracy” was developed to insist precisely on this specificity, on the need to democratize relations between multiple democracies.
The single currency poses a particular challenge because it forces us to cooperate politically, which was not necessarily self-evident when everyone had their currency and tried to use it to get an advantage against their neighbours. Henceforth, central institutions like the European Central Bank are needed, but in light of the principle of non-domination, it is also necessary to give the countries a relatively large amount of autonomy by relying more on voluntary cooperation that is aware of externalities and systemic risks than on a central authority lacking legitimacy. The democratization of the EU can be guaranteed only by bringing together several sources of legitimacy, national and European, and getting away from the hierarchical principle as much as possible. The ultimate goal is to find the right institutional arrangement, the one that will best advance the arguments that conform to the demoicratic principle by bringing into our national debates the externalities and systemic risks that the States impose on their neighbours. These are the grounds on which the European Parliament and other means of mobilizing Europe’s citizens can advance democracy.
KeywordsEuro zone Democracy European governance Democratic deficit Incompleteness of the euro
- Cheneval, Francis. 2011. The Government of the Peoples. On the Idea and Principles of Multilateral Democracy. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
- Cheneval, Francis, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2012. The Case for Democracy in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 51 (2): 1–17.Google Scholar
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2015. The Lure of Technocracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
- Nicolaïdis, Kalypso, and Max Watson. 2016. Sharing the Eurocrats’ Dream: A Democratic Approach to EMU Governance in the Post-Crisis Era. In The End of the Eurocrat’s Dream, ed. Damian Markus Jachtenfuchs Chalmers and Christian Joerges, 50–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Harvard: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- Van Parijs, Philippe. 1997. Should the EU Become More Democratic? In Democracy and the European Union, ed. Andreas Follesdal and Peter Koslowski, 287–301. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar