Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed Functionalism
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Functionalism about truth, or alethic functionalism, is one of our most promising approaches to the study of truth. In this chapter, I chart a course for functionalist inquiry that centrally involves the empirical study of ordinary thought about truth. In doing so, I review some existing empirical data on the ways in which we think about truth and offer suggestions for future work on this issue. I also argue that some of our data lend support to two kinds of pluralism regarding ordinary thought about truth. These pluralist views, as I show, can be straightforwardly integrated into the broader functionalist framework. The main result of this integration is that some unexplored metaphysical views about truth become visible. To close the chapter, I briefly respond to one of the most serious objections to functionalism, due to Cory Wright
KeywordsAlethic functionalism Alethic pluralism Experimental philosophy Conceptual pluralism Ramsification Epistemic circularity Kwasi Wiredu Michael Lynch Cory Wright
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