Advertisement

Strong Truth Pluralism

  • Seahwa Kim
  • Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

Alethic pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being true. Propositions about riverbanks might be true because they correspond with reality whereas propositions about the law might be true because they cohere with the body of law. According to strong alethic pluralists there is no such thing as truthassuch, that is, no single truth property applicable across all truthapt domains of discourse. Truth is many, not one. Moderate alethic pluralists, on the other hand, endorse a generic truth property applicable across all truthapt discourse. However, propositions belonging to different domains may possess this generic truth property in virtue of having distinct properties such as correspondence or coherence. Truth is both one and many. This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to present and develop a version of strong alethic pluralism in some detail. This task has been somewhat neglected in the literature, as strong pluralism is widely regarded as a nonstarter due to a battery of seemingly devastating objections. The problem of mixed compounds has been regarded as being particularly pressing—and difficult—for the strong pluralist to deal with. The second aim of the chapter, then, is to give a strongly pluralist response to the problem of mixed compounds

Keywords

Truth (alethic) pluralism Moderate truth (alethic) pluralism Strong truth (alethic) pluralism Truth Problem of mixed compounds Mixed conjunctions Mixed disjunctions Domains Reductionism Grounding Hyperintensionality 

References

  1. Barnard, R., and T. Horgan. 2006. Truth as Mediated Correspondence. The Monist 89: 31–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. ———. 2013. The Synthetic Unity of Truth. In Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, ed. Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen and C.D. Wright, 180–196. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Bradley, F. 1914. Essays on Truth and Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  4. Cook, R.T. 2011. Alethic Pluralism, Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions. The Philosophical Quarterly 61: 624–629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Cotnoir, A. 2009. Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions: Some Alternatives. Analysis 69: 473–479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. ———. 2013a. Validity for Strong Pluralists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 563–579.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. ———. 2013b. Pluralism and paradox. In Pedersen & Wright 2013a, 339–350.Google Scholar
  8. Cotnoir, A., and D. Edwards. 2015. From Truth Pluralism to Ontological Pluralism and Back. The Journal of Philosophy 112: 113–140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. David, M. 1994. Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Devitt, M. 1984. Realism and Truth. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  11. Edwards, D. 2008. How to Solve the Problem of Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 68: 142–149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. ———. 2009. Truth-conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions. Analysis 69: 684–688.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. ———. 2011. Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49: 28–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. ———. 2012. On Alethic Disjunctivism. Dialectica 66: 200–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. ———. 2013. Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism. In Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, ed. Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen and C.D. Wright, 113–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  16. ———. 2018. The Metaphysics of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Gamester, W. forthcoming. Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth. To appear in Analysis. doi:  https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx165.
  18. James, W. 1907. Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. ———. 1909. The Meaning of Truth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Kim, S. & Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen. (ms). The Return of the Many: A Critical Appraisal of Moderate Truth Pluralism Through Metaphysics.Google Scholar
  21. Kölbel, M. 2008. “True” as Ambiguous. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 359–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. ———. 2013. Should We Be Pluralists About Truth? In Pedersen & Wright 2013a, 278–297.Google Scholar
  23. Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  24. Lynch, M. 2001. A Functionalist Theory of Truth. In The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. M. Lynch, 723–749. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  25. ———. 2004. Truth and Multiple Realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 384–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. ———. 2006. ReWrighting Pluralism. The Monist 89: 63–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Lynch, M.P. 2009. Truth as One and Many. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. ———. 2013. Three Questions for Alethic Pluralism. In Pedersen & Wright 2013a, 21–41.Google Scholar
  29. Newman, A. 2007. The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  30. Pedersen, Nikolaj J.L.L. 2006. What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89: 103–117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. ———. 2010. Stabilizing Alethic Pluralism. The Philosophical Quarterly 60: 92–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. ———. 2012a. True Alethic Functionalism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20: 125–133.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. ———. 2012b. Recent Work on Alethic Pluralism. Analysis 72: 588–607.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. ———. 2014. Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics. Erkenntnis 79: 259–277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. ———. (ms-a). Grounding Manifestation Pluralism.Google Scholar
  36. ———. (ms-b). Grounding Determination Pluralism.Google Scholar
  37. ———. (ms-c). Moderate Truth Pluralism and the Structure of Doxastic Normativity.Google Scholar
  38. ———. (ms-d). Moderate Pluralism About Truth and Logic: Truth and Logic as One, Quasi-truth and Quasi-logic as Many.Google Scholar
  39. ———. (ms-e). Subject Matter and Domains.Google Scholar
  40. Pedersen, Nikolaj J.L.L., and D. Edwards. 2011. Truth as One(s) and Many: On Lynch’s Alethic Functionalism. Analytic Philosophy 52: 213–230.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Pedersen, Nikolaj J.L.L., and M.P. Lynch. 2018. Truth Pluralism. In The Oxford Handbook of Truth, ed. M. Glanzberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  42. Pedersen, Nikolaj J.L.L., and C.D. Wright, eds. 2013a. Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  43. ———. 2013b. Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism. In Pedersen & Wright 2013a, 87–112.Google Scholar
  44. ———. 2016. Pluralist Theories of Truth. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta, (Spring 2016 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/truth-pluralist/
  45. Peirce, C.S. 1878/1992. How to Make Our Ideas Clear. Reprinted in e Essential Peirce, ed. N. Houser and C. Kloesel, 124–141, Vol. 1. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
  46. Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Rasmussen, J. 2014. Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Rescher, N. 1973. The Coherence Theory of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  49. Russell, B. 1912. Problems of Philosophy. Reprinted by Oxford University Press, 1971.Google Scholar
  50. Rosen, G. 2010. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, ed. B. Hale and A. Hoffmann, 109–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Sainsbury, M. 1996. Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 899–904.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Sher, G. 2005. Functional Pluralism. Philosophical Books 46 (4): 311–330.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. ———. 2013. Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route from Thought to Reality. In Pedersen & Wright 2013a, 157–179.Google Scholar
  54. ———. 2016. Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Tappolet, C. 2000. Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logic: A Reply to Beall. The Philosophical Quarterly 50: 382–384.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Vision, G. 2004. Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and Its Critics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Walker, R.C.S. 1989. The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-realism, Idealism. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  58. Williamson, T. 1994. A Critical Study of Truth and Objectivity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30: 130–144.Google Scholar
  59. Wittgenstein, L. 1921. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In Annalen der Naturphilosophie. English translation by D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness (1961). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  60. Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  61. ———. 1994. Realism, Pure and Simple: A Reply to Timothy Williamson. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2: 327–341.Google Scholar
  62. ———. 1995. Truth in Ethics. Ratio 8: 209–226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. ———. 1996. Response to Commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 911–941.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  64. ———. 1998. Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24 (suppl. vol.): 31–74.Google Scholar
  65. ———. 2001. Minimalism, Deflationism, Pragmatism, Pluralism. In The Nature of Truth, ed. M. Lynch, 751–789. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  66. ———. 2013. A Plurality of Pluralisms. In Pedersen & Wright 2013, 123–153.Google Scholar
  67. Wyatt, J. 2013. Domains, Plural Truth, and Mixed Atomic Propositions. Philosophical Studies 166: 225–236.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  68. Young, J.O. 2001. A Defence of the Coherence Theory of Truth. The Journal of Philosophical Research 26: 89–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  69. Yu, A. 2017. Logic for Pluralists. Journal of Philosophy 114: 277–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Scranton CollegeEwha Womans UniversitySeoulSouth Korea
  2. 2.Underwood International CollegeYonsei UniversityIncheonSouth Korea

Personalised recommendations