The Metaphysics of Domains

  • Douglas Edwards
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)


Pluralist theories of various sorts commit themselves to the notion of a domain, but what exactly is a domain? In this chapter, I aim to answer this question. I begin by suggesting that the notion of a domain is not exclusive to pluralist theories and is implicit in a number of different philosophical views. I then outline both the semantic and metaphysical aspects of a domain before considering two problems associated with domain individuation that have been posed for truth pluralism: the problem of mixed atomics and the problem of mixed compounds. I show how solutions to each problem drop out of the account of domains given.


Truth Pluralism Domains Properties Objects Predicates Singular terms Sparse properties Abundant properties Mixed atomics Mixed compounds Mixed conjunctions 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Douglas Edwards
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUtica CollegeUticaUSA

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