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Aletheic and Logical Pluralism

  • Kevin ScharpEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

Aletheic pluralism is the view that there is more than one truth property, and logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Usually the truth properties described by the aletheic pluralist are familiar ones advocated by parties debating the nature of truth (e.g., the correspondence property, the pragmatic property, and coherence property). Likewise, the logics described by the logical pluralist are familiar ones advocated by parties debating the nature of logic (e.g., classical, intuitionistic, and relevant). However, one can be an aletheic pluralist by focusing on properties of truth that result from different approaches to the aletheic paradoxes instead. And one can be a logical pluralist by focusing on logics that result from different approaches to the aletheic paradoxes. Moreover, one could combine these two alternative pluralisms into a single view according to which the logic and the truth property differ depending on the context, but they are coordinated so that in contexts with stronger logics, the truth property is weaker, and in contexts with weaker logics, the truth property is stronger. I first formulate this coordinated pluralism about truth and logic and then evaluate it as a competitor with more traditional approaches to the aletheic paradoxes.

Keywords

Truth (alethic) pluralism Logical pluralism Domain-based pluralism Context-based pluralism Coordinated pluralism Semantic paradox Context Replacement theory Ascending truth Descending truth Revenge paradox 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arché Philosophical Research CentreUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsUK
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsUK

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