Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological Pluralists

  • Andy D. Yu
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)


There have been few attempts to answer the challenges for alethic pluralists to maintain standard accounts of the logical operators and of logical consequence in a sufficiently systematic and precise way. This chapter presents a pluralist account of logic and semantics that answers these challenges. The chapter also shows how to accommodate logical pluralism and ontological pluralism within an extension of the framework.


Truth (alethic) pluralism Logical pluralism Ontological pluralism Mixed atomic Mixed compounds Mixed inferences Domains Satisfaction Quantification Logical consequence 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andy D. Yu
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of LawUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

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