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A Plea for Immodesty: Alethic Pluralism, Logical Pluralism, and Mixed Inferences

  • Chase B. Wrenn
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

The problem of mixed inferences is a bugbear for alethic pluralism and logical pluralism alike. Michael Lynch’s alethic functionalism is meant to solve the problem for alethic pluralists. But, as Lynch observes, it is tempting to combine alethic and logical pluralism, and doing so threatens to reintroduce the problem. Lynch proposes a way out of the problem for alethic cum logical pluralists. I argue that Lynch’s way out is a dead end, and the combination of logical and alethic pluralism is unattractive.

Keywords

Logical pluralism Domain-based logical pluralism Truth (alethic) pluralism Truth (alethic) functionalism Classical logic Intuitionistic logic Mixed inferences Modesty principle Virtual logical pluralism 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of AlabamaTuscaloosaUSA

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