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Logical Particularism

  • Gillman Payette
  • Nicole Wyatt
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

Logics—that is to say logical systems—are generally conceived of as describing the logical forms of arguments as well as endorsing certain principles or rules of inference specified in terms of these forms. From this perspective, a correct logic is a system which captures only (and perhaps all of) the correct principles, and good—that is, logical—reasoning is reasoning which at the level of logical form conforms to the principles of a correct logic. In contrast, as logical particularists we reject the idea that logical validity is a property of logical forms or schema, and instead take validity to be a property of particular inferences. In this chapter, we describe and defend this radically different approach to validity and explore the particularist understanding of the relationship between logical systems and logical reasoning.

Keywords

Logical particularism Logical generalism Logical pluralism Global logical pluralism Local logical pluralism Logical nihilism Validity Logical consequence Logical form Modelling Natural language consequence Explanation 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CalgaryCalgaryCanada

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