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Introduction

  • Nikolaj J. L. L. PedersenEmail author
  • Jeremy Wyatt
  • Nathan Kellen
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

The introductory chapter introduces the overarching themes of the volume, provides relevant background, and summarizes each of the contributions to the volume.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen and Jeremy Wyatt have both benefited from support from the National Research Foundation of Korea (grants no. 2013S1A2A2035514 and 2016S1A2A2911800). This support is gratefully acknowledged.

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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
    • 1
    Email author
  • Jeremy Wyatt
    • 1
  • Nathan Kellen
    • 2
  1. 1.Underwood International CollegeYonsei UniversityIncheonSouth Korea
  2. 2.University of ConnecticutStorrsUSA

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