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Non-trivial Witness Encryption and Null-iO from Standard Assumptions

  • Zvika Brakerski
  • Aayush Jain
  • Ilan Komargodski
  • Alain Passelègue
  • Daniel Wichs
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11035)

Abstract

A witness encryption (WE) scheme can take any \({{\textsf {NP}}}\) statement as a public-key and use it to encrypt a message. If the statement is true then it is possible to decrypt the message given a corresponding witness, but if the statement is false then the message is computationally hidden. Ideally, the encryption procedure should run in polynomial time, but it is also meaningful to define a weaker notion, which we call non-trivially exponentially efficient WE (XWE), where the encryption run-time is only required to be much smaller than the trivial \(2^{m}\) bound for \({{\textsf {NP}}}\) relations with witness size m. We show how to construct such XWE schemes for all of \({{\textsf {NP}}}\) with encryption run-time \(2^{m/2}\) under the sub-exponential learning with errors (LWE) assumption. For \({{\textsf {NP}}}\) relations that can be verified in \({{\textsf {NC}}^1}\) (e.g., SAT) we can also construct such XWE schemes under the sub-exponential Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption. Although we find the result surprising, it follows via a very simple connection to attribute-based encryption.

We also show how to upgrade the above results to get non-trivially exponentially efficient indistinguishability obfuscation for null circuits (niO), which guarantees that the obfuscations of any two circuits that always output 0 are indistinguishable. In particular, under the LWE assumptions we get a XniO scheme where the obfuscation time is \(2^{n/2}\) for all circuits with input size n. It is known that in the case of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) for all circuits, non-trivially efficient XiO schemes imply fully efficient iO schemes (Lin et al., PKC ’16) but it remains as a fascinating open problem whether any such connection exists for WE or niO.

Lastly, we explore a potential approach toward constructing fully efficient WE and niO schemes via multi-input ABE.

Notes

Acknowledgements

We thank Nir Bitansky for many initial discussions on the topics of this work. We thank Antigoni Polychroniadou and Hoeteck Wee for their helpful comments on a previous version of our work. We also thank the anonymous reviewers for their remarks.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zvika Brakerski
    • 1
  • Aayush Jain
    • 2
  • Ilan Komargodski
    • 3
  • Alain Passelègue
    • 2
  • Daniel Wichs
    • 4
  1. 1.Weizmann Institute of ScienceRehovotIsrael
  2. 2.UCLALos AngelesUSA
  3. 3.Cornell TechNew YorkUSA
  4. 4.Northeastern UniversityBostonUSA

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