We-Experience—With Walther

  • Hans Bernhard SchmidEmail author
  • Xiaoxi Wu
Part of the Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences book series (WHPS, volume 1)


Shared beliefs, collective emotions and joint intentions are widely recognized to be at the core of the social world. Beliefs, emotions and intentions, however, largely depend on experience. It is hard to see how the former could be joint, shared, or collective, without any possibility of togetherness at the experiential level. Sharing experiences is thus a key for human sociality.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ViennaViennaAustria
  2. 2.Southeast UniversityNanjingChina

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